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We build a model of debt for rms with investment projects for which
exibility and free cash ow problems are important issues. We focus on
the factors that lead the rm to select the zero-debt policy. Our model
provides an explanation of the so-called "zero-leverage puzzle" (Strebu-
laev and Yang (2013)). It also helps to explain why zero-debt rms often
pay higher dividends compared to other rms. In addition, the model
generates new empirical predictions that have not yet been tested. For
example, it predicts that rms with zero-debt policy should be inuenced
by free cash ow considerations more than by bankruptcy cost consider-
ations. Also the choice of zero-debt policy can be used by high-quality
rms to signal their quality. This is in contrast to most traditional sig-
nalling literature such as Leland and Pyle (1977), for example, where debt
serves as a signal of quality. The model can explain why the probability
of selecting the zero-debt policy is positively correlated with protability
and investment size and negatively correlated with the tax rate. It also
predicts that rms that are farther away from their target capital struc-
tures are less likely to select the zero-debt policy compared to rms that
are close to their target levels.
Keywords: Zero-Debt Policy; Flexibility; Capital Structure; Tax Shield;
Free Cash Flow Problem; Debt Overhang; Dividend Policy
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1 Introduction
A rms capital structure is one of the top issues in corporate nance theory.
Over the years nancial economists have formulated and tested various theories
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including trade-o¤ theory, pecking-order theory, and market timing. Despite the
tireless e¤orts, they remain some of the most contraversial topics in economics.
In recent years, zero-debt policy research has been an increasingly growing
area of interest.1 Strebulaev et al (2013) call it the "zero-leverage puzzle". The
standard trade-o¤ theory of capital structure predicts that a rms capital struc-
ture is the result of trade-o¤ between the tax advantage of debt and its expected
bankruptcy cost. This theory, however, seems to fail to explain situations when
debt is totally absent. Pecking-order theory (Myers and Majlu¤, 1984) predicts
that under asymmetric information rms should use internal funds before debt
and debt before equity. This implies that zero-debt policy can only be adopted
by nancially unconstrained rms with large amounts of free cash. This is,
however, usually not the case (see, for example, Leary and Roberts (2005)).
Trade-o¤ theory also predicts that rms should instantaneously adjust their
capital structure toward their target capital structure. However, Leary et al
(2005) nd that rms restructure their leverage infrequently.
Another interesting aspect of zero-debt rms is their dividend policy. Stre-
bulaev et al (2013) nd that many of these rms are dividend payers and that
they pay higher dividends than other rms. Dang (2013) nds that among
zero-debt rms there are two di¤erent groups: rms that pay dividends (consis-
tent with Strebulaev et al (2013)) and rms that do not. Dang (2013) argues
that the latter group consists of young, unprotable and nancially constrained
rms. Strebulaev et al (2013) discuss the high dividends of zero-debt rms and
nd them quite puzzling from the points of view of traditional theories. For
example, from the pecking-order theory point of view rms which are subject
to asymmetric information (nancially constrained rms seem to be tting into
this group) should keep their cash reserves and use them for future investments.
Also if rms were looking for exibility they would not pay dividends. In this
article we shed some new light on this issue.
As an example, consider the situation of Apple in 2012-2014. During these
years Apple had no debt.2 The companys earnings had been steadily growing
between 2005-2012 and many analysts and managers including its new CEO Tim
Cook spoke about its excessive liquidity problems (Ximénez and Sanz (2014)).
On March 15, 2012, CNBC conrmed that Tim Cook admitted the companys
board of directors was actively involved in deciding what to do about the excess
cash. Secondly the company continued its growth plans and constantly faced
numerous investment opportunites (Ximénez et al (2014)). Cook mentioned
that priorities included making as many investments as possible in research
and development. At the same time the company started to pay dividends.
Furthermore the level of dividends was quite high (Lazonick (2017), Ximénez
et all (2014)). A few factors are worth mentioning. As a large corporation,
Apple was facing di¤erent types of agency problems including ones arising from
1See, for example, Strebulaev and Yang (2013), Dang (2013), Bessler, Drobetz, Haller and
Meier (2013), Sundaresan, Wang, and Yang (2015) and Byoun and Xu (2013).
2See, for example, https://www.macrotrends.net/stocks/charts/AAPL/apple/debt-equity-
ratio
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the ownership-management conicts.3 The famous founder and CEO of Apple
Steve Jobs, who owned a large fraction of Apples shares, died in 2011.4 One
can assume that the company was facing a larger extent of potential agency
problems since the separation between ownership and management increased
compared to the previous period. To summarize the above discussion: Apple
in 2012-2104 was a company that had no debt, paid large dividends and faced
free-cash ow and exibility challenges.
We build a model of capital structure that contains both exibility and
free cash ow problems. Maintaining exibility is an important incentive for
rms to adopt a zero-leverage policy (see, for example, Dang (2013)) and the
free cash ow problem is one of the key factors in, for example, Byoun, Kim
and Yoo (2013). We consider a rm with an investment project that is facing
future uncertainty regading earnings and investment size. Firms can be of three
di¤erent types. If a rm does not have any nancing constraints or free cash
ow problems, the rst-best strategy to overcome a potential debt overhang is
to issue long-term debt. The rm would not loose any potential earnings from
protable investment opportinities in the second stage of the project.5 Another
group of rms are ones that are totally constrained in that they are not able to
raise any external nancing. These rms will use internal funds for nancing
and will not pay any dividends (keep internal cash for future investments).
This is consistent with the zero-debt policy of the non-payers group in Dang
(2013). Our main focus, however, is on the third group of rms namely those
that are partially constrained. These rms are able to raise short-term debt for
nancing. These rms will be dealing with potential exibility or debt overhang
problems when nancing their future investment needs. In addition, rms are
facing a free cash ow problem. Managerial teams can be involved in empire-
building or an overinvestment problem so a rms owners should take this into
account when making capital structure and dividend decisions. These rms
face a trade-o¤ between the advantages of debt including tax shield and the
disciplinary advantage of limiting the free cash ow problem (Jensen, 1986) and
the disadvantages of debt related to the debt overhang problem (Myers, 1977).
Our model predicts that rms that can potentially adopt the zero-debt policy
are rms for which the free-cash ow problem is relatively more important than
potential bankruptcy costs. These rms are more likely to pay large dividends
to avoid free cash ow problems related to a managers overinvestment and these
rms are more likely to adopt a zero-debt policy. It forces them to use more
internal funds to nance their investments and mitigates potential free cash ow
problems related to the accumulation of uninvested (retained) earnings. Also
we nd that the probability of adopting the zero-debt policy increases with the
expected protability of a rms projects, the expected size of investments and
their risk and it decreases with tax rates. These observations are consistent
3See, for example, https://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/041015/how-do-modern-
corporations-deal-agency-problems.asp
4https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Steve_Jobs
5Hart and Moore (1994) show that long-term debt has its advantages in dealing with the
debt overhang problem.
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with recent empirical ndings (see, for example, Lotfaliei (2018)). On the other
hand rms that face relatively small bankruptcy costs and a high likelihood of
overinvestment by managers are not likely to adopt the zero-debt policy. They
are likely to issue debt to provide discipline for the manager and to benet
from its tax advantage. Our analysis also suggests that the choice of the zero-
leverage policy can be used by high-qulaity rms to signal their quality. This
is in contrast to most traditional signalling literature such as Leland and Pyle
(1977), for example, where debt serves as a signal of quality. The model also
predicts that the zero-leverage policy is likely to be counter-cyclical and the
positive debt policy is likely to be procyclical. It is consistent with the results
of Dang (2013), Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997).
With regard to dividend policy we nd that zero-debt rms usually pay
dividends and in most cases they pay higher dividends than other rms which is
consistent with Strebulaev et al (2013). In addition the model generates some
new predictions that have not been tested yet. For example we nd that high
dividends cannot be used alone by high-quality rms as a signal of quality. This
is consistent with previous literature on the dividend signalling (see, for example,
Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005)). We nd that the dividend decision
together with the capital structure decision can be used to signal a rms quality.
For example, a separating equilibrium may exists where the high-quality rm
uses zero-debt policy and pays high dividends and the low-quality rm uses
positive debt policy and pays a smaller dividend. The low-quality rm will not
mimick the high-quality rm since the potential benets from mitigating the
debt overhang problem are not as valuable for this rm as they are for a high-
growth rm since it has a smaller expected investment project size and lower
expected payo¤s in the second stage of the project. So unlike the high-growth
rm these benets for the low-growth rm can be outweight by tax shield losses.
Bessler et al (2013) nd that zero-debt rms have positive abnormal return
compared to their peers which is consistent with our result.
The model also predicts that the likelihood of selecting the zero-debt policy is
di¤erent for di¤erent types of rms. Underleveraged rms that are far from their
target capital structures are less likely to drop the zero-debt policy compared to
rms that are close to their target levels. A similar result was found in Leary and
Roberts (2005), who used an adjustment cost argument (see also Warr, Elliotte,
Koeter-Kant, and Oztekin (2012)). Note that the adjustment cost approach has
been questioned in recent literature (see, for example, Lambrinoudakis, 2016).
Lotfaliei (2018) extends trade-o¤ theory by including a real option to wait
before issuing debt. This can induce a zero leverage, even when standard trade-
o¤ theory predicts that these rms should have leverage. The real options
e¤ect is similar to that of bankruptcy costs. The value of rms with no debt
include the option whose value is derived from future debt benets and reduced
bankruptcy costs. This article proposes a model that determines the optimal
timing for the aquisition and sale of debt and nds support for its predictions
through simulations and empirical analysis. Unlike our paper, it does not reach
any closed solutions or propositions regarding the zero-debt policy. Most of
their results are obtained via simulations using di¤erent numerical assumptions
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and shapes of di¤erent functions in particular the non-convexity of debt costs
which is crucial for their results.6
Our paper is one of the rst that analyzes debt policy under the debt over-
hang and free cash problems simultaneously. Hart and Moore (1994) analyze a
model with long-term debt where managers have both an incentive to overinvest
(similar to the free cash ow problem) and underinvest (debt overhang). They
argue that a company with high debt will nd it hard to raise capital since new
security holders will have low priority relative to existing creditors. Conversely
they show that for a company with low debt there is an optimal debt-equity
ratio and mix of senior and junior debt if management undertakes unprotable
as well as protable investments. In contrast to our paper, the zero-debt policy
only emerges for risk-free high protable rms which is not consistent with re-
cent empirical evidence. Hirth and Uhrig-Homburg (2010) examine the e¤ect of
overinvestment and underinvestment problems on a rms cash ow and capital
structure decisions in a continuous-time framework. In contrast to our paper,
the overinvestment problem is modelled as an asset substitution problem. They
show that stockholder-bondholder agency conicts cause investment thresholds
to be U-shaped in leverage and decreasing in liquidity. The paper shows that
an interior solution for liquidity and capital structure optimally trades o¤ tax
benets and agency costs of debt. The zero-debt policy does not emerge in
equilibrium.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains a literature
review. Section 3 presents the model and its main results. Section 4 analyzes
factors that a¤ect the probability of selecting/dropping the zero-debt policy
and also provides a comparative static analysis regarding zero-debt rms and
dividend-paying/non-paying rms. Section 5 presents a variation of the model
with asymmetric information. Section 6 presents the models implications and
its consistency with empirical evidence. Section 7 discusses the models robust-
ness and extensions and Section 8 concludes.
2 Literature review.
2.1 Debt Overhang
The debt overhang problem occurs when rms do not invest in projects with
positive net present values (NPVs). Equityholders may pass up protable in-
vestments because the rms existing debtholders capture most of benets from
the project (Myers, 1977). This is because the NPV of a project is sometimes
di¤erent for shareholders and creditors. If the managers act in the interest of
the shareholders, a rm will choose projects with the highest earnings for share-
holders. The problem is that projects with positive NPVs (for the rm as a
whole) sometimes have low payo¤s to the shareholders if the rms debt is large
enough. Debt has priority over equity in cases when earnings are not su¢cient
to satisfy every claimholder.
6See also Haddad and Lotfaliei (2019).
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Some notable papers include the following. Gertner and Scharfstein (1991)
show that, conditional on ex-post nancial distress, making a xed promised
debt payment due earlier (i.e., shorter-term) raises the market value of the debt
and thus the rms market leverage, leading to more debt overhang. Diamond
(1981) argues that rms build their reputaion in order to raise their credit rat-
ing and improve their ability to issue debt. Similar to our paper it focuses on
nancially constrained rms that are not able to issue long-term debt. How-
ever, zero-debt policy is not considered in this paper. In contrast, our model
includes both debt overhang and free cash ow considerations. Diamond and
He (2014) compare short-term debt and long-term debt with regard to potential
debt overhang problems.7
Overall theoretical literature on debt overhang has failed to recongnize op-
portunities to combine debt overhang and free cash ow ideas in order to gen-
erate zero-debt results. The closest paper, in this sense, to ours is Berkovich
and Kim (1990). They combine the underinvestment (debt overhang) and over-
investment problems to generate predictions about debt covenants and debt
seniority. However, in their article overinvestment has the form of an asset sub-
stitution problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and not a free cash ow problem
(as in our paper) and the zero-debt policy is not explained.
2.1.1 Flexibility Theory of Capital Structure
We cover exibility theory in a separate subsection of the debt overhang section
since there is still a debate of whether or not this theory represents a separate
theoretical idea from the debt overhang idea. Firms in the development stage
need nancial exibility. There is a lot of uncertainty because they consider a
lot of investment projects, including their nancing strategies, which requires a
lot of exibility. Having too much debt in capital structure will not help here
(similar to a debt overhang problem). In addition, rms in the development
stage likely do not have a favorable track record (i.e., credit ratings) of borrowing
(Diamond, 1991) and are most likely to be turned down for credit when they
need it most. Mature rms, for the most part, generate positive earnings and
have more nancial exibility than developing rms. Accordingly, these rms
rely more on debt nancing to fund their investments as they face less nancing
constraints in that they expect to repay their debt with future earnings.
Flexibility theory nds a lot of support in empirical studies (Byoun, 2011)
and manager surveys (Graham and Harvey, 2001). Gamba and Triantis (2008)
develop a theoretical model that analyzes optimal capital structure policy for
a rm that values exibility in the presence of personal taxes and transaction
costs. Among recent papers note Sundaresan, Wang, and Yang (2015) who
analyze a growing rm that represents a collection of growth options and assets
in place. The rm trades o¤ tax benets with the potential nancial distress
and endogenous debt overhang costs over its life cycle. The authors argue that
the rm consistently chooses conservative leverage in order to mitigate the debt-
7For more theoretical discussions about debt overhang see Miglo (2016a).
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overhang e¤ect on the exercising decisions for future growth options.
Like debt overhang literature, exibility theory literature does not provide a
good understanding of facts related to the zero-debt policy. The importance of
nancial exibility, as compared to major theories of capital structure, remains
an open question. More work that compares exibility theory with other theories
is expected.
2.2 Free Cash Flow Theory
Grossman and Hart (1982) and Jensen (1986) argue that the usage of debt -
nancing can be used to mitigate the tendency for empire-building. Jensen
(1986, 1989) argued that debt nancing is an e¤ective way to resolve agency
problems between managers and investors: It would limit managerial discretion
by minimizing the free cash-ow available to managers and thus provide pro-
tection to investors. Sometimes in literature this idea is referred to as debt
and discipline theory.8
As we know, using debt as a major source of nancing incurs substantial
costs of nancial distress. Firms may face direct bankruptcy costs or indirect
costs in the form of debt-overhang or asset substitution. To reduce the risk
of nancial distress, it may be desirable to have the rm rely partly on equity
nancing.
DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) consider a dynamic model where a rms
manager can divert the rms cash ow. It is shown that an optimal mechanism
can be implemented by combining equity, long-term debt and a line of credit.
Zheng (2009) analyzes the e¤ect of a rms capital structure on managerial
incentives and controlling the free cash ow agency problem and compares it
to incentives provided by compensation contracts. It was found that debt and
executive stock options act as substitutes in attenuating a rms free cash ow
problem. Edmans (2011) suggests that the option to terminate a manager early
minimizes the investors losses if the manager is unskilled. It also deters a skilled
manager from undertaking e¢cient long-term projects that risk low short-term
earnings. This paper demonstrates how risky debt can overcome this tension.
Our paper adds the dividend policy choice and the debt overhang problem
to a typical free cash ow model. In such an environment rms can select
between debt as a disciplinary device to mitigate the free cash ow problem
as in traditional literature and another policy that includes zero debt and high
dividends.9
8A related result is the costly state-verication theory (see Townsend, 1979, and Gale
and Hellwig, 1985). It considers an environment where a rms earnings are unobservable
by investors, the verication of earnings is costly and managers can report earnings at their
discretion (ex-post moral hazard).
9High payout policy is often considered an alternative tool to discipline managers (Easter-
brook (1984), Brav et al (2005)) but usually not in combination with zero-debt policy.
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2.3 Signalling Under Asymmetric Information
Information asymmetries are characterized by one entity having more informa-
tion than another. Insiders may have private (exclusive) information about a
rm that is unavailable to outsiders. Not knowing for sure what the rm is
worth, outside investors will not be willing to pay much for its newly issued
equity. Therefore, if the rm is actually good, then its equity will be under-
priced. Because of this, a good rm should always rely on retained earnings
to nance new projects. These ideas were put forth by Myers (1984) and My-
ers and Majlu¤ (1984). High-quality rms will use internal funds rst and in
their absence will issue debt and only as a last resort will issue equity (so called
pecking order). Risky debt also su¤ers from asymmetric information problems
(for example in the form of higher interest rates for rms) but not to the same
degree as equity underpricing.
As mentioned in Miglo (2011), the empirical evidence regarding whether
rms follow the pecking order is mixed. The negative reaction to equity issues,
or in general to leverage reducing transactions, usually nds empirical support.
The evidence regarding the link between the extent of asymmetric information
and capital structure choice and regarding the pecking order is mixed.
The signalling theory of capital structure o¤ers models in which capital
structure serves as a signal of private information (Ross (1977), Leland and
Pyle (1977)). Usually in these models, the market reaction on debt issues is
positive. Empirical evidence is mixed regarding the predictions of signaling
theory.
Finally consider the signalling theory of dividends. It suggests that if a com-
pany announces a decrease/increase in dividend payouts, it can be interpreted
as a signal of negative/positive future prospects of the company.
Bhattacharyas (1979) model assumes that external investors do not have full
information about a companys expected cash ows. The ndings claim that the
dividends contain information about present and prospective cash ows and for
that reason they can be used by managers as signals to help close the information
gap. Miller and Rock (1985) consider both dividend and investment policies.
They argue that a struggling company may raise dividend payments to a level
where investors would assume that the rm is nancially good and consequently
pay a higher amount for its shares. A stronger company might have to compete
by raising its dividends beyond what the struggling company can match. The
Williams (1998) model helps explain why some companies aim to both raise
capital and distribute dividends at the same time. It also suggests that rms
with more valuable internal information tend to distribute higher dividends.
Lee and Ryan (2002) analyse dividend signalling theory and the relationship
between earnings and dividends. They conclude that the dividend payment
strategy is mostly inuenced by free cash ow and recent performance. Be-
nartzi, Michaely and Thaler (2012) argue that dividends do not signal future
performance but reext past performance. Recent empirical literature nds
mixed evidence regarding signalling theories of dividends (Brav et al, 2005).
All of the above presented studies try to answer the question whether divi-
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dends have any signalling power and a¤ect the share price. In spite of numerous
articles and studies the issue weather dividend announcements contain informa-
tion is still unclear and no consensus has been reached. Our paper contrbutes
to this literature by suggesting that dividends can be used together with capital
structure to signal a rms quality.
3 The Model and Basic Results
3.1 Model description.
Debt overhang/Flexibility theory suggest that if a rm has too much debt it
will be harder for them to obtain loans when necessary (Myers, 1977). Firms
therefore preserve debt capacity or hold back on issuing debt because they want
to maintain exibility. Firms maintain excess debt capacity or larger cash bal-
ances than warranted by current needs, to meet unexpected future requirements.
While maintaining nancial exibility has value to rms, it also has a cost; ex-
cess debt capacity implies that a rm is giving up some value (e.g. tax benet
of debt) and has a higher cost of capital.
Free cash ow theory (Jensen, 1986) suggests that managers have a tendency
to overinvest if the threat of bankruptcy is not high enough (empire-building).
This moral hazard problem can be mitigated if the rm uses debt as a discipli-
nary device. If a manager spends funds ine¢ciently, the rm will not be able to
generate enough cash to cover their existing debt and the probability of bank-
ruptcy will increase. In this case the probability of losing a job for managers
increases (Hoskisson et al, 2017). As an alternative to issuing debt, the rm can
increase dividends to shareholders. This will also reduce the amount of available
free cash (Brav et al, 2005).
Some basic ideas can be illustrated by the following model. Consider a rm
that exists for two periods T = 1; 2. Initially the rm has cash K. The rm
also has an investment project. The project requires an amount of investment
I and can generate cash ows as follows. First it brings an amount C1 which
can later be invested (second stage) with the average rate of return r. I and
K are known while C1 is risky. It is uniformly distributed between 0 and C1.10
We also assume that C1=2 > I and r > 0, which implies that both stages of the
project have a positive net present value. The rm belongs to the shareholders
who we will call the entrepreneur. The entrepreneur is responsible for making
capital structure and dividend decisions. To nance the initial investment I,
the rm can either use internal funds (E) or issue debt (D), I = E +D.11
Debt that is issued to nance the project should be paid back at T = 2. Let
F be the face value of the debt (including principal and interest) due at the time
that the investment in the second stage of the project must be made (T = 2).12
10 In Section 7 we discuss the models robustness with regard to this assumption as well as
other assumptions.
11Later we discuss other strategies.
12Throughtout the models solution F and not D is used as the main variable in our model
to describe the amount of debt. Technically F is a better variable since it includes the interest
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The rm is nancially constrained and is not able to issue a long-term debt, i.e.
debt due upon the completion of the second stage of the project. Hence, the rm
is facing a potential debt overhang or exibility loss problem. A high amount
of debt limits the rms investment capacity. If F > C (C denotes available
cash before the second stage of the investment project), the rm will not be
able to make any investments and if F < C, the rm can make a full or partial
investment in the second stage of the project.13 A disadvantage of having low
debt though is that it can reduce, for example, the amount of tax shield and
ultimately increase the cost of capital and respectively reduce the value of the
rm. This approach is consistent with Graham (2000) and Strebulaev et al
(2013) who suggest that zero-debt rms seemingly do not use any substitutes
for debt that provide similar advantages as leases for example. Let F  be the
maximal amount of debt that the rm can issue.14 We assume that F   C1.
This allows us to model a large spectrum of possible nancing strategies from
100% internal funds to 100% debt.15
In addition, the rm faces a free cash ow problem. During the rst stage
of the project (before C1 becomes known), the rms managerial team (call it
the manager) has an opportunity to invest the rms funds in an "ine¢cient"
project that does not increase the rms value but instead can provide private
benets for the manager. The manager cannot be perfecty monitored by the
entrepreneur (in the spirit of Grossman and Hart (1982) or Jensen (1986)).
We assume that if the manager decides to invest an amount X of the rms
available cash in an ine¢cient project, he gets aX, 0  a  1. The rm
gets nothing and it just loses an amount X in this case. The manager is also
bankruptcy averse. When deciding whether to make an ine¢cient investment
the manager faces a trade-o¤ between receiving private benets and reducing
disutility from increasing the bankruptcy risk of the rm. When investing in
an "ine¢cient" project, the manager consequently increases the chances of the
rm going bankrupt. If this is the case, the managers disutility is  B, B  0
(job loss, reputation loss, family values etc.).
When choosing the amount of debt, the rm faces a trade-o¤ between the
exibility, free cash ow and cost of capital minimization problems. When debt
equals F , the value created by minimizing the cost of capital (in absolute values
for shareholders; analogous, for example, to the present value of the tax shield)
equals Ft, 0  t  1 for any F  F . Everybody is risk-neutral and the risk-free
interest rate is zero. The timing of events is present in Figure 1.
amount and does not a¤ect any results while simplifying the solution presentation. Obviously,
in equilibrium, D and F are connected with each other.
13Miglo (2016b) considers a similar idea. It does not, however, have the free cash ow or
asymmetric information considerations.
14The assumption about the existence of F  is quite natural. One can assume that if
the amount of debt raised by the rm goes beyond some threshold the debt becomes very
costly/impossible to bear. It can be related to expected bankruptcy costs, credit rating
problems, relationship with banks etc. Note that this assumption is technically not crucial
but it helps generate some interesting comparative static results.
15These assumptions will be discussed in Section 7.
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-t = 1 t = 2s s
A rm with initial amount of cash K and
an investment project that costs I
selects its capital structure (E and D)
and dividend d
The manager decides to invest
an amount W in an
"ine¢cient" project
First stage of the project is completed and
C1 becomes known
If available cash is less than F ,
the rm is bankrupt
Otherwise the rm pays its debt
and an investment is made in
the second stage of the project
Second stage earnings are realized
and the entrepreneur receives
second-stage dividends
Figure 1. The sequence of events.
3.2 No free cash ow problem and no nancial constraints
Let us rst consider a perfect market case when the rm does not face any
free cash ow problems and no nancial constraints exist. More specically we
assume that the manager is totally honest and does not make any ine¢cient
investments in private projects and that the rm can issue long-term debt.16
This assumption assures that a debt overhang problem does not arise. As a
result, the rm will not lose any potential earnings from the second stage of the
project given that r > 0 because the rm can invest the full amount of available
cash in the second stage of the project. Under these conditions the amount of
debt issued by the rm as well as its dividend policy are irrelevant (Modigliani-
Miller, 1958). If taxes are introduced in the model, the optimal policy is to
select F = F . This policy minimizes the cost of capital and maximizes the
investment return. The creditors will be happy to provide a long-term loan
with a face value F such that




Indeed, even if the rm paid the highest possible dividend K   (I   D)
at T = 1, the expected payment to the creditors (recall that C1 is uniformly
distributed) equals
16Hart and Moore (1994) show formally how the usage of long-term debt can mitigate
managerial incentives for ine¤cient investments.
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is the probability that C1(1 + r)  F and that debt can be
paid in totallity and respectively F2 is the average amount that the creditors
will receive when C1(1 + r) < F . One can see that (1) equals (2). The rms
expected value is
d+K   (I  D)  d+
C1(1 + r)  F
C1(1 + r)
(
C1(1 + r) + F
2
  F ) (3)
Here d is the dividend paid to the entrepreneur at T = 1; K   (I  D)   d is
the amount of retained earnings at the beginning of T = 2 and C1(1+r)+F2 is the
average value of C1(1 + r) for the case when C1(1 + r)  F . Using (2), we can
write (3) as
K   I +
C1
2
(1 + r) (4)
Therefore without taxes both the capital structure and dividend policy are
irrelevant because (4) does not depend on D, F or d. If t > 0, the optimal debt
is F = F  and the rms value equals K   I + C12 (1 + r) + F
t. Now consider
the case with a free cash ow problem and nancial constraints.
3.3 Financially constraint rm with free cash ow prob-
lem.
3.3.1 Managers decision at the end of T=1.
Consider the managers decision at the end of T = 1. Let C0 be the amount of
retained earnings (after the rm pays dividends) at T = 1 and R be the amount
of cash that will be left if the manager withdraws W;W +R = C0. Three cases
are possible. 1) R  F . In this case the rm can pay back its debt and the
managers utility is aW = a(C0   R). Since it is decreasing in R, the optimal
R = F and the managers expected utility E(U) is a(C0   F ). 2)
C0  F > R (5)
When making a decision, the manager does not know the value of C1. Depending
on the future realization of C1, two situations may exist. 1. C1  F   R. In
this case the rm can pay back its debt and the managers utility is a(C0  R).
2. C1 < F  R. In this case the rm will be bankrupt at the end of T = 2 and
the managers overall utility is a(C0 R) B. The probability that C1  F  R
equals C1 F+R
C1
and the probability that C1 < F   R equals F R
C1
. Hence, the






The managers choice of W and respectively R is determined by maximizing
E(U). Note that (6) is linear in R so R = 0 if a > B
C1
and otherwise R should
be maximized (if a = B
C1
, the manager is indi¤erent between his options. For
simplicity we assume that in this case the manager will not bankrupt the rm).
It follows from the above analysis (note that in both cases C0  F ) that if
a  B
C1
, the optimal R = F . Otherwise, the optimal R = 0.
3) C0 < F . Similarly to the analysis in the previous case we nd that the
expected value of the managers utility equals a(C0   R)   F R
C1
B. We have
R = 0 if a > B
C1
and R = C0 otherwise.
This leads to the following lemma.
Lemma 1. 1) C0  F . Then R = 0 if a >
B
C1
and R = F otherwise. 2)
C0 < F . Then R = 0 if a >
B
C1
and R = C0 otherwise.
Proof. Follows from the the above analysis.
The interpretation of Lemma 1 is following. If the bankruptcy cost is more
important for the manager than private benets from overinvestments (i.e. B is
relatively higher than a), the optimal decision for the manager is to keep cash
in the rm. Otheriwse the manager will make a lot of ine¢cient investments
and receive a large amount of private benets.
3.3.2 Entrepreneurs dividend decision at T=1.
Although the capital structure and dividend decisions are made simultaneously
(e.g. during the shareholder meeting) we will rst calculate the optimal dividend
policy for any arbitrarily chosen capital structure and then we will analyze the
optimal capital structure choice. We have R0 = d+ C0, where
R0 = K   (I  D) (7)
is the amount of funds available after the rms capital structure was determined
including the amount of retained earnings used to nance the initial stage of
the project (I  D).
Proposition 1. 1) If a  B
C1
, d = R0; 2) if a < B
C1
, d = R0   F when
R0 > F and F <
2C1r
1+r ; d = R0 when R0 > F >
2C1r
1+r or when F > R0 and
F > R02 +
C1r
1+r ; and d = 0 otherwise.
Proof. Two cases are possible.
1) a < B=C1. In turn three situations may exist. 1. R0   d  F . As follows
from Lemma 1 the manager will steal R0  d F so the remaining amount of
retained earnings F will be used to pay back debt at T = 2. The rm can invest





(1 + r) + Ft (8)
Since (8) is increasing in d, the optimal d = R0 F . The rms value equals
R0   F +
C1
2 (1 + r) + Ft.
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2. F < R0 < F + d. Since C0 = R0   d < F , Lemma 1 implies that in this
case R = C0 = R0 d. The rm is not able to make a full amount of investment
for the second stage of the project. If C1  F   (R0   d), the rm can still
make a partial investment. Since the probability that C1  F   R0 + d equals
C1 F+R0 d
C1
, the rms expected value equals:
d+
C1   F +R0   d
C1
(R0   d+
C1 + F  R0 + d
2
  F )(1 + r) + Ft (9)
Since (9) is convex in d, possible solutions are either d = R0   F or d = R0.
According to (9), if d = R0   F , E(V ) = R0   F +
C1
2 (1 + r) + Ft: If d = R0,




(1+r)+Ft. Proposition 1 for the case a < B
C1
and F < R0
follows from the comparison of the above expressions, i.e. d = R0   F is better
if F < 2C1r1+r and otherwise d = R0 is the best strategy.
3. R0 < F . Note that in this case R0   d < F . Also note that Lemma 1
implies R = C0. Similarly to the previous case we nd that the rms expected
value is as in (9). This time, the possible solutions are either d = 0 or d = R0.
According to (9), if d = 0,
E(V ) =
(C1   (F  R0))
2
2C1
(1 + r) + Ft (10)
If d = R0,
E(V ) = R0 +
(C1   F )
2
2C1
(1 + r) + Ft (11)







2) a  B=C1. Note that according to Lemma 1, in this case R = 0 and also
that C1   F  C1. The latter implies that as long as F > 0 a full investment
in the second stage is not possible. Two cases are possible. 1. C1  F . In
this case the rm can make a partial investment and the rms value equals
d+ (C1   F )(1 + r) + Ft. 2. C1 < F . In this case the rm is not able to make
any investments in the second stage of the project and the rms value to the
entrepreneur is d+ Ft.
Next we need to calculate the expected change in the rms value. The prob-
ability that C1 > F equals (C1   F )=C1 and the average amount of investment
needs is (F + C1)=2 . Hence, the expected rms value E(V ) equals
d+





  F )(1 + r) + Ft (12)
Since (12) is increasing in d, the optimal solution is d = R0.
The interpretation of Proposition 1 is as follows. If the entrepreneur expects
the manager to overinvest, he will pay a high dividend. Otherwise, some funds
can be kept inside the rm.
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3.3.3 Entrepreneurs capital structure decision at T=1.
Proposition 2. When a  B
C1
, F = 0 if r  32 t or r <
3




Otherwise F = F .
Proof. Let a  B=C1. In this case, as follows from Proposition 1, d =
K   (I  D) and R = 0. The rms value equals K   I +D + C1 F
C1
(F+C12  
F )(1 + r) + Ft. The creditors will be paid in full when C1 > F and they will



















  F )(1 + r) + Ft (13)
Since (13) is convex, the possible solutions are either F = 0 or F = F .
According to (13), if F = 0,















t. Proposition 2 follows from the comparison of this














Proposition 3. If a < B
C1
and t is su¢ciently small, the optimal amount
of debt increases with C1 and r.
Proof. See Appendix.
Two points from the proof of Proposition 3 are discussed below. First, if
R0  F (17)
the optimal amount of debt is either F = 2C1r1+r or F = F
. Also in this case
d = 0.
Second, we present an example (for simplicity we consider the case K = I,
r < 1 and t is marginally small) of the link between optimal debt and C1. Let
C = (1+r)F

2r . Then we nd that F = F
 if C1 > C; and F =
2C1r








Figure 1. C1 and debt.
The results of Proposition 3 regarding C1 and r are interesting and are
opposite to the results of Proposition 2. In the case that the manager is less likely
"to steal" money from the rm (a < B
C1
), the entrepreneur may be interested
to keep cash for the second period and hence use more debt to nance the rst
stage of the project. The higher the expected size of the potential investment
in the second stage the higher the amount of debt issued by the rm. For
example, it follows from Figure 1 that when C1 is high the rm uses as much
debt as possible (F ). Otherwise it is a trade-o¤ between the advatages and
disadvatges of debt. If C1 is really small, the rm will issue a smaller amount
of debt.
Our focus is on rms with the zero-leverage policy and factors that lead to
this policy. The comparative static analysis reveals the following.
4 Comparative Statics.
Corollary 1. An increase in the expected performance of a rms projects
increases its chances of selecting the zero-debt policy. An increase in the un-
certainty about future projects/size of investments also increases the chances
of selecting this policy. An increase in the tax rate decreases the chances of
selecting the zero-debt policy.
An increase in r in (15) increases the chances that D = 0. It is the potential
return that the rm earns on its projects that provides the value to exibility.
Other things remaining equal, rms operating in businesses where projects earn
substantially higher returns than their hurdle rates should value exibility more
than those that operate in stable businesses where excess returns are small.
An increase in C1 in (15) also increases the chances that D = 0. If exibility
is viewed as an option, its value will increase when there is greater uncertainty
about future projects; thus, rms with predictable capital expenditures should
value exibility less.
An increase in t in (15) increases the chances that F = F . Debt should
be high when a rm has high prot and uses leverage to reduce taxes, or when
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potential bankruptcy costs are relatively low and the cost of debt remains rel-
atively low regardless of the level of debt or when the cost of equity remains
signicantly higher relative to the cost of debt (for example due to the situation
in the stock market) when debt is low. Those rms should value exibility less.
Corollary 2. Non-dividend-paying rms are as follows: 1) managers do
not steal money; 2) debt is relatively high; 3) free cash is relatively small.
The only case when rms do not pay dividends is when a < B=C1 and
condition (17) holds. The former means that in this case the manager steals
less funds from the company compared to the case when a  B=C1. The latter
means that R0 = K   I + D is relatively small. Other things being equal it
implies that free cash (K) should be relatively small in order for ((17) to hold.
Finally these rms take maximal debt and benet from its tax advantages.
Corollary 3. Dividend paying zero-leverage rms (ZLPD) di¤er from div-
idend paying non-zero leverage rms (NZPD) in that: 1) for ZLPD free-cash
ow problems are more important than bankruptcy costs; 2) ZLPD pay higher
dividends.
With regard to the rst point note that for ZLPD we have a  B=C1. With
regard to the second point note that ZLPD pay the entire amount of retained
earnings available as dividends. For NZPD di¤erent cases can emerge. In most
cases they keep some cash inside the rm. Hence on average, ZLPD pay higher
dividends than NZPD.
So far our focus has been on the role of r, t and C1. Now consider the role




F 1 < F

2 (18)
Condition (15) predicts that Firm 2 is less likely to select the zero-leverage
policy than Firm 1.
Corollary 4. The rm with F 2 is less likely to select the zero-debt policy
than the rm with F 1 .
The proof follows directly from (15) and that F 1 < F

2 .
One can assume that F  is connected to the term target debt ratio. This
term is usually used in literature with regard to tarditional static trade-o¤ the-
ory. In our model, as was argued in Section 3.2, this is an optimal amount of
debt for a rm that does not face any free cash ow or exibility problems etc.
In this case Corollary 4 has an interesting empirical interpretation. If both rms
have no debt initially (by the time the decisions should be made), condition (18)
means that Firm 1 is closer to its target ratio than Firm 2. Therefore Corollary
4 means that the rm that is farther from its target debt level is less likely to
select the zero-debt policy.
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5 Asymmetric Information About Firms Invest-
ment Opportunities/Performance.
Now suppose that information about the rms performance is asymmetric.
More specically, let us assume that there are two types of rms. The maximal
prot for the stage 1 investment for type 1 equals C1 and for type 2 it equals
C2, C1 < C2.
5.1 Separating Equilibrium.
An equilibrium is dened as a situation where no rm type has an incentive to
deviate. A separating equilibrium is one where rms select di¤erent strategies.
We will also check that the o¤-equilibrium beliefs of market participants survive
the intuitive criterion of Cho-Kreps (1987). This condition means that the
market o¤-equilibrium beliefs are reasonable in the sense that if for any rm
type its maximal payo¤ from deviation is not greater than its equilibrium payo¤
then the market should place a probability of 0 on possible deviations of this
type. The denitions above are consistent with the standard perfect bayesian
equilibrium denition (see, for instance, Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991) with the
addition of an intuitive criterion, which is quite common in these types of games
(see, for instance, Nachman and Noe, 1994).
The idea is that a rm with better growth opportunities (higher C1) may se-
lect the zero-debt policy as a signal of growth. Indeed, low-growth opportunity
rms may nd it unprotable to mimick this strategy because it limits its invest-
ment opportunities in the second stage and no gain is achieved from reaching
lower interest rates. In contrast if the high-growth rm selects a positive debt
strategy, it will be mimicked by the low-qaulity rm because of opportunities of
getting a loan with a lower interest rate.
Proposition 4. There is no separating equilibrium where rms select di¤er-
ent levels of debt and pay the same amount of dividends; there is no separating
equilibrium where rms selects the same level of debt and pay di¤erent amounts
of dividends.
Proof. See Appendix.
For the rst part the idea is simply that in this case the low-quality rm will
be able to either mimick the high-quality rm and get a low interest rate (in case
the high-quality rm has positive debt) or increase dividends if the high-quality
rm does not issue debt and thus could not pay a high dividend. As follows
from (7), the rm that issued more debt will be able to save more internal funds
and therefore pay a higher dividend. For the second part, if rms use the same
amount of debt they should have similar preferences for dividends as follows
from Propositions 1, 2 and 3. Therefore one of the rms will eventually deviate
by selecting a dividend amount di¤erent from its equilibrium value.
Proposition 5. There exists a separating equilibrium where type 2 selects
F2= 0 and d2 > 0 and type 1 selects F1> 0 and d1 6= d2. A separating equilib-


















Also suppose that type 2 selects F2 = 0 and d2 = K   I and Type 1 selects
F1 = F
 and d1 = K   I +F . Note that (19) implies that the strategies of the
rms correspond to the optimal symmetric information strategies described by
Propositions 1 and 2. Equilibrium payo¤s are: type 2  K   I + C2(1+r)2 ; type
1 -







(1 + r) + F t (21)
If type 2 deviates and mimicks type 1, it will have to borrow with a higher
interest rate corresponding to type 1: D = F    (F
)2
2C1
. So its prot will be












(1+r)+F t which is in turn less than K I+ C2(1+r)2 because
F  < 2C2(r t)
r
. If type 1 deviates, its payo¤ is K   I + C1(1+r)2 which is smaller






(1 + r) + F t because 2C1(r t)
r
< F . So
this equilibrium exists.
Proposition 5 implies that the high-quality rm selects zero-debt policy and
a high level of dividend to e¤fectively signal its quality.
5.2 Pooling Equilibrium.
Next we analyze the pooling equilibria. We dene a pooling equilbrium as
one where both types of rms select the same strategy. If multiple pooling
equiliria exist we will use the mispricing criterion to evaluate which one is most
likely to exist. We use the standard concept of mispricing that can be found,
for example, in Nachman and Noe (1994). The magnitude of mispricing in a
given equilibrium is equal to that of undervalued type(s). The overvaluation of
overvalued type(s) does not matter.














and x is su¢ciently large.
Proof. See Appendix.
In Proposition 6 we nd that pooling with no debt exists as long as the
conditions of optimality for the zero-debt policy under symmetric information




) hold for both types. This is because there is no
adverse selection game with the value of debt (interest rate) for the low-quality
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type since no type issues any debt in equilibrium. An equilibrium with positive
debt exists only if the fraction of high-quality rms is su¢ciently high. Respec-
tively the interest rate is su¢ciently low and the high-quality types do not have
an incentive to deviate to the zero-debt policy.
6 Model implications.
Our paper contributes to what Strebulaev et al (2013) called the zero-leverage
puzzle. As was discussed previously the zero-debt phenomena and its extent are
quite puzzling from the point of view of the main capital structure theories. Our
article argues that a combination of debt overhang and free cash ow consider-
ations may lead a partially constraint ed rm (that can only issue short-term
debt) to optimally select zero-debt policy (Proposition 2). In contrast to Liafeli
(2018) our paper does not rely on numerical simulations. Our model predicts
that for rms using the zero-debt policy free cash ow considerations are more
important than bankruptcy costs. The importance of free cash problems for
zero-debt rms is consistent with Byoun et al (2013).
The model also generates many predictions regarding the features of rms
using the zero-leverage policy (corollary 1). The likelihood of adopting the zero-
leverage policy is positively correlated with a rms projects protability (re-
spectively the likelihood of dropping this policy is negatively correlated with it).
This result is consistent with Strebulaev et al (2013), Byoun et al (2013), Bessler
et al (2013) and Ebrahimi (2018). This is consistent with the second group of
zero-debt rms (which pay dividends) in Dang (2013). Remember that in our
model zero-debt rms pay dividends. Below we will discuss other opportunities
for generating zero-debt results with some changes in model assumptions.
Also the likelihood of adopting the zero-leverage policy is positively corre-
lated with the expected investment size. This is consistent with Strebulaev et al
(2013) and Dang (2013) in that the zero-debt policy is likely to be adopted by
rms with more growth opportunities. This is also consistent with Bessler et al
(2013), where zero-debt policy likelihood increases with the market-book ratio.
The latter is often seen in literature as a measure of growth opportunities. The
probability of choosing the zero-leverage policy also increases with risk. This
result is consistent with Strebulaev et al (2013), Dang (2013) and Bessler et
al (2013). In Bessler et al (2013) for example, there is a positive correlation
between asset volatility and zero-debt policy. Finally, the likelihood of adopting
the zero-leverage policy is negatively correlated with the tax rate. This result
is consistent with Strebulaev et al (2013), Dang (2013) and Bessler et al (2013).
Firms that are farther from their target debt levels are less likely to select
the zero-leverage policy compared to rms that are closer to their target debt
levels (corollary 4). In our model this is because if they are farther from their
target ratio, the move towards the target ratio can bring about a high tax shield
other things being equal.
These rms also have higher cash balances. This follows from Proposition
1 because a higher K implies a positive dividend. Firms with zero debt pay
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higher taxes. This approach is consistent with Graham (2000) and Strebulaev
et al (2013) who suggest that there is no substitute for the debt advantage (even
leases for example). Also rms that pay dividends replace interest expenses.
Total payments are relatively at. Firms that pay higher dividends pay less
interest because they have zero debt. In addition, as was mentioned previously,
Corollary 2 predicts that rms that do not pay dividends should have lower cash
balances.
Corollary 3 implies that zero-leverage dividend paying rms pay a signif-
icantly higher dividend than non-zero-leverage rms. This is consistent with
Strebulaev (2013). Also the reason why zero-debt rms do not issue debt is
not because they want to retain high exibility with high cash. On the con-
trary, they pay dividends and reduce cash. This is consistent with Byoun et
al (2013) and Strebulaev et al (2013). Non-dividend-paying rms never have
zero-leverage. This is implied by Corollary 2. The only rms for which d = 0
are ones that correspond to case 1 in Propostion 3 and these rms have high
debt. This is consistent with the spirit of Strebulaev et al (2013) in that divi-
dends are substitutes for interests so total payo¤ is stable accross all rms. If
we had some rms that dont pay dividends also have zero-debt (respectively
zero interest) that would contradict the results in Strebulaev et al (2013).
Consistent with Dang (2013) rms do not issue debt when economic condi-
tions worsen (Proposition 8). In the same spirit, debt is procyclical (Proposition
9). This is consitent with for example in our model it may mean an increase
in B (bankruptcy cost). As follows from (13) the likelyhood of adopting the
zero-debt policy decreases. As implied by Proposition 8, zero-debt is more
likely when x decreases meaning the average quality of rms in the economy
decreases.
If we consider Case 1 in Proposition 3 and supppose that the entrepreneur
becomes risk-averse then a negative component in (22) can be added. If this
component is large enough the resulting solution will imply a zero-debt policy.
This situation is not a focus of our analysis but can be interpreted as another
group of companies using the zero-leverage policy. This, for example, could be
rms for whom the free cash ow problem is not very important (for example
rms where managers have high stakes of equity or family rms) and in contrast
increasing risk and bankruptcy costs can be costly because for example the
entrepreneur is not well diversied. Then the case when a < B=C1 is consistent
with ZLNP rms in Dang (2013), family rms in Strebulaev et al (2013) and
constrained rms in Bessler et al (2013).17
17The following cases are consistent with the spirit of our results (we discussed the Apple
2012 case previously). As we mentioned, this company had a lot of cash at that time, had no
debt and paid relatively high dividends.
SEI Investments Company is a nancial services company headquartered in
Oaks, Pennsylvania, United States, with o¢ces in Indianapolis, Toronto, Lon-
don, Dublin, The Netherlands, Hong Kong, South Africa, and Dubai (see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SEI_Investments_Company) SEI manages, advises or
administers $809 billion in hedge funds, private equity, mutual funds and other man-
aged assets. This includes $307 billion in assets under management and $497 billion in
client assets under administration. The company has no debt and pays steady dividends
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7 Model extensions and robustness.
Di¤erent rst stage earnings distribution. One interpretation of the results in
our model (based on (13)), is that the likelihood of adopting the zero-debt
policy is positively correlated with the average earnings from stage one (and
respectively the average investment opportunity for stage two) as well as the risk
of earnings at stage one and the risk of the investment size. This is because C1=2
is the average amount of earnings (so it increases with C1) and the risk increases
with C1 as well (the risk can, for example, be measured by the variance of project
earnings, which is equal to C1
2
=12 because C1 is uniformly distributed). So in
our model the average return and risk are positively correlated. A lower C1
automatically implies a lower average level of earnings and a lower risk and
a higher C1 means a higher average and a higher risk. One can extend the
model and assume, for example, that C1 is distributed uniformly between say
C1min 6= 0 and C1max. Then there may be a situation where the average level
of earnings increases but the risk decreases. Our results show that the results
hold. Condition (13) becomes: F = 0 if
F <
(Ca +)r   2t
r
and F = F  otherwise, where  = C1max C1min2 . One can see that if  = Ca
and respectively Ca = C1=2 this becomes (13). Otherwise most qualitative pre-
dictions remain the same but calculations become much more complicated. The
likelihood of adopting the zero-debt policy increases with average performance
(Ca) and with risk as well because Ca >  but it decreases with t, which is
consistent with Corollary 1.
Another comment relates to the fact that we have a uniform distribution
for the projects earnings. Note three points here. First, this assumption is
not uncommon in theoretical literature related to capital structure and debt
maturity or debt overhang (see, among others, Collins and Gbur (1991)) and
the reasong being probably that it works very well with risk-neutral investors
because it directs the focus on market imperfections and not long calculations
related to risk aversion. Secondly, note that the normal distribution becomes
uniform when some parameters change so by continuity the conclusions should
(https://seic.com/investor-relations). In addition to its large amounts of cash available, the
company has had agency problems related to some of its managers. Note the case of Allen
Stanford for example (https://www.businessreport.com/article/stanford-group-money)
Another example is the multinational corporation Amdocs that specializes in soft-
ware and services for communications, media and nancial services providers and dig-
ital enterprises. The company is quite successful and consistently pays stable divi-
dends (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Amdocs). Also it constantly penetrates new mar-
kets, develops new projects etc. So one can assume that on one hand the company
needs exibility since it is often involved in important investments projects. Also
the moral hazard and agency problems seem to be quite important since the com-
pany often creates new legal entities, replaces management, creates joint ventures with




hold if the value of the parameters are su¢ciently close. Thirdly and most
importantly note that the crucial part of our argument is the convexity of the
expected return function in, for example, (13). This convexity may hold for
some other types of distributions.
Outside equity. Most rms analyzed by empirical literature related to zero-
debt policy face the choice between internal funds and debt. In our case if
external equity is possible then it will not be enforceable because the manager
will steal all non-invested funds (zero-risk of bankruptcy) so all initial funds
should be invested and there is no room for outside equity. If managers are
honest then a rst-best can easily be implemented with outside equity (similar
to long-term debt).18 Quantitatively though, some conditions may change. It is
denitely an interesting direction for future research. Note that most existing
theoretical literature on zero-debt policy often considers it separately from out-
side equity. One of the reasons for this seems to be that the basic ideas related
to issuing debt (debt overhang, exibility etc.) are quite di¤erent for equity
issues (see, for example, Byoun et al (2013)).
Issuing equity is possible at T = 2. If the rm can issue equity (or junior
debt) at T = 2 it helps to rollover previously issued debt and thus avoid a debt
overhang problem. So a rst-best could be achieved. An interesting extension
for further research is to make the possiblity of issuing equity or junior debt at
T = 2 conditional on some results in the rst period (credit rating, protability
etc.). Intuitively a possible scenario is that the rm selects the zero-debt policy
in order to improve its opportunities of issuing equity at T = 2.
Issuing debt is impossible at T = 1. One can consider what could happen
if issuing debt is impossible at T = 1. This type of rm is often mentioned in
empirical literature and is often found to be young, not-protable, without a
credit rating etc. So in the model we can for example assume that K < I and
allow partial investment at T = 1, i.e the rm can invest an amount K in the
rst stage and generate some earnings at T = 2. The main model predictions
do no change much because the rm that can issue debt at T = 1 in most cases
will select the maximal possible I at T = 1. To see this consider formula (12).
Because C12 > I, this is increasing in I. As for severally constrained rms, since
C1
2 > I, they will invest as much as they can at T = 1., i.e K. So no dividends
will be paid at T = 1. This group of zero-leverage rms are non-payers ((Dang,
2013) and Bessler et al (2013)).
Di¤erent types of moral hazard. In our model, the manager trades-o¤ private
benets from "ine¢cient" investments and the cost incurred in the case of the
rms bankruptcy. The managers objective function can be made more com-
18We have analyzed a models variation that included the possibility of using debt-based
crowdfunding. Under debt-based crowdfunding, the rm promises to return the inital in-
vestments from funders with interest. We found that the main results of the model are not
a¤ected. Some slight di¤erences exist. For example, when debt is risk-free (which can be the
case without demand uncertainty) debt-based crowdfunding can be used as a signalling tool
along with reward-based crowdfunding. However, in a more realistic scenario when demand is
uncertain and debt is risky, the main result stands, which favors reward-based crowdfunding.
The same holds when modelling moral hazard.
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plicated by including, for example, some bonuses from good investments. Our
calculations show however that since these bonuses will be strongly correlated
with the non-bankruptcy event for the rm, qualitatively not many things will
be di¤erent in this settings while calculations become much more complex.
The distribution of types. In sections 4 and 6, which deal with asymmetric
information, we use two types of rms to illustrate the main ideas. This is
also very typical in literature. A natural question though is whether the results
stand if one considers a case with multiple types.19 Our analysis shows that
most conclusions remain the same: under asymmetric information, the zero-
debt policy can be used by a high-quality rm to signal its qulaity. In the case
of multiple types, however, one may have a semi-separating or even pooling
equilibrium where only the type with the highest cost (speaking about Section
4) will be indi¤erent between the zero-debt policy and positive debt policy and
all other types select zero-debt. In Section 5, our analysis shows that the results
may hold even in a multiple types environment though more research is required.
The main implication of our analysis holds. In particular, our results show that
there is no semi-separating equlibrium where the average quality of types that
choose zero-debt policy is higher than those that choose positive debt, which is
consistent with our basic model.
Di¤erent signal for C1 and investment at T = 2. In our model the invest-
ment technology is that all earnings from period 1 can be invested in stage 2.
One can consider an extension where rms receive two separate signals at the
beginning of T = 2: one is about rst-period earnings and one is about the cost
of second stage investments. As far as we can see the calculations become much
more complicated without adding any new ideas.
Di¤erent values for r. Uncertainty regarding r does not matter in the model
since there is no long-term debt and everybody is risk-neutral so only the average
retrun counts in the second stage. The models analysis for large values of r does
not seem to be very practical so it is omitted for brevity. A possible extension
is to assume that rms own private information about r and not C1. As far as
we can see, it should generate similar predictions to the ones in the paper.
8 Summary and Conclusions
We build a model of debt for rms with investment projects for which exibility
and free cash ow problems are important issues. We focus on the factors that
lead rms to select the zero-debt policy. Our model provides an explanation of
the so-called "zero-leverage puzzle" (Strebulaev et al, 2013). It also helps ex-
plain why zero-debt rms often pay higher dividends compared to other rms.
In addition, the model generates new empirical predictions which have not yet
been tested. For example, it predicts that rms with the zero-leverage policy
paying dividends should be inunced by free cash ow considerations more than
19Proofs are available upon demand. Note that the calculations become much longer and
technically more complicated, which is very typical for multiple type games with asymmetric
information.
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by bankruptcy cost considerations. The choice of zero-leverage policy can also
be used by high-quality rms to signal their quality. This is in contrast to most
traditional signalling literature such as Leland and Pyle (1977), for example,
where debt serves as a signal of quality. The model can explain why the proba-
bility of selecting the zero-debt policy is positively correlated with protability
and investment size and negatively correlated with the tax rate. It also predicts
that rms that are farther away from their target capital structure are more
likely to drop the zero-debt policy while rms that are close to their target level
are more likely to continue the policy.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3. For shortness we consider the case K = I and
r < 1.20
Let a  B=C1. We have R0 = d+C0, where R0 = I   (I  D) = D. Hence,
R0 = D  F (22)
When debt is risk-free, its face value equals the real value: R0 = D = F . When
debt is risky, R0 = D < F . Therefore Proposition 1 for the case a  B
C1




1+r ; and d = 0 otherwise.








It follows from Proposition 1 that in this case d = 0. The rms value equals
(see the proof of the previous proposition for this case):
E(V ) =
(C1   (F  R0))
2
2C1
(1 + r) + Ft (24)
The creditors will be paid in full when C1 > F   R0 and they will receive


























. Solving for R0
we nd:
R0 = F   C1  C1
20The proofs for other cases are available upon demand.
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The smallest root here does not work since F  F   C1 and R0  0. Substi-





















if 2C1r1+r < F






















It follows from Proposition 1 that in this case d = R0. The rms value equals
(see the proof of previous proposition for this case):
E(V ) = R0 +
(C1   F )
2
2C1
(1 + r) + Ft (31)
The creditors will be paid in full when C1 > F and they will receive C1 otherwise.













The rms vallue then equals:




























1+r ) = C1(
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1+5r
1+r   1). If C1(
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1+5r
1+r   1) > F
, this




1+r   1) and F = F
. In the former case E(V ) =  C1(
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+ C1(1+r)2 + F
t.
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Since (25) is greater than (32), case 1 provides better value for the rm
as long as condition (26) holds. It implies that F = C1(
q
1+5r




1+r   1 <
2r
1+r . Therefore if C1 
F
(1+r)
2r , optimal F = F

(case 1). If C1 <
F
(1+r)
2r , F =
2C1r
1+r (case 1) or F = F
 (case 2). The
comparison of the rms values for both cases leads to the following. F = 2C1r1+r
if t < r(1  F
(1+r)+2C1r
2C1(1+r)
) and F = F  otherwise.





.21Part 1. Several cases may exist. 1. Type 2 selects F2 and Type 1 selects
F1 > F2. Here in turn several cases are possible. In all cases we assume that
o¤-equilibrium market beliefs are that the rm is type 1 which will minimize
the value of debt. It is based on Brennan and Kraus (1987).
1) 2C1(r t)
r







In this case a possible scenario is that F1 = F . Any other strategy is not
optimal for type 1 based on proposition 2 and it will therefore deviate. Also
type 1 will pay dividend K I+D = K I+F   (F
)2
2C1
= D1: Type 2 however
will not be able to pay this amount as dividend. The maximal amount for type




which is less than D1 because F1 = F  > F2. So this
situation is impossible.




In this case a possible scenario is that F1 = 0. Any other strategy is not
optimal for type 1 based on proposition 2 and it will therefore deviate. This
however contradicts the assumption that F1 > F2.
2. Type 2 selects F2 and Type 1 selects F1 < F2.




In this case a possible scenario is that F1 = 0. Any other strategy is not
optimal for type 1 based on proposition 2 and it will therefore deviate. Also
type 1 will pay dividend K   I. If type 2 selects F2 > 0, this is not an optimal




In this case a possible scenario according to Proposition 2 is F1 = F  but
this contradicts F1 < F2. So this equilibrium is impossible.
Part 2. An equilibrium where type 1 selects F = 0 and d = 0 and Type 2
selects F = 0 and d > 0 is impossible. Since debt is not issued, the fact that
rms pay di¤erent dividends does not a¤ect any payo¤s if either rm deviates
so asymmetric information does not matter. The optimal d for type 1 will be
d > 0. Similarly, an equilibrium where type 1 selects F = 0 and d > 0 and
type 2 selects F = 0 and d = 0 does not exist because type 2 would prefer






21Proofs for other cases are available upon request.
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2. Type 1 selects F > 0 and d1 = 0 is not optimal for type 1 and it will
deviate by paying a higher dividend.





< F  and F = F .






(1 + r) + F t; type 1












(1 + r) + F t which is greater than its equilibrium payo¤. So
this equilibrium does not exist.
Proof of Proposition 5. The following example provides the proof of the rst
part.






< F  < 2C2(r t)
r
. Consider the following situ-




O¤-equilibrium market beliefs are that the rm is type 1 which will minimize
the value of debt. It is based on Brennan and Kraus (1987). Equilibrium payo¤s
are: type 2  K   I + C2(1+r)2 ; type 1 -







(1 + r) + F t (33)






(1 + r) + F t. This






(1 + r) + F t which is in turn less
than K   I + C2(1+r)2 because F
 < 2C2(r t)
r
. If type 1 deviates, its payo¤ is




In order to prove part 2 consider the following case. Type 1 selects F1 = 0
and Type 2 selects F   F2 > 0. The only candidate for such an equilibrium is
the case a > B
C1
and F  < 2C1(r t)
r
, i.e. its the only case when type 1s optimal
strategy is F = 0. Equilibrium payo¤s are: type 1  K   I + C1(1+r)2 ; type 2 -








(1 + r) + F2t (34)
If type 2 deviates and selects F2 = 0, it makes K   I +
C2(1+r)
2 , which is






(1+ r)+F t because F  < 2C2(r t)
r
.






(1 + r) + F t is in turn greater than (34) because of the
convexity of the payo¤ function.





.22 There are several potential candidates for an equilibrium. Again, the
o¤-equilibrium market beliefs are that the rm is type 1.1. Both types select
22Proofs for other cases are available upon request.
31
F = 0 and d = 0. In this case we should have 2C1(r t)
r







< F . If 2C1(r t)
r
> F , type 1 would deviate and select
F > 0 (Proposition 1). However, even if these conditions hold, type 1 would
deviate and pay a higher dividend (again based on Prposition 1). So such an
equilibrium does not exist.
2. Both types select F = 0 and d > 0. A possible scenario is d = K   I.
Otherwise rms will deviate and pay a higher dividend. Also we should have





Equilibrium payo¤s are: type 2  K I+ C2(1+r)2 ; type 1 K I+
C1(1+r)
2 . If







This is less than K   I + C1(1+r)2 because
2C1(r t)
r
< F . So this equilibrium
exists.
3. Both types select F > 0 and d > 0. A potential candidate for an
equilibrium is the case F = F  and d = R0. If d < R0, any undistributed cash
will be "stolen" by the manager (Proposition 1). Also F < F  is not optimal
for both types because of the convexity of the prot function (Proposition 2).
Suppose F  < 2C2(r t)
r
. The creditors will be paid in full when C1 > F  and will
receive C1 otherwise. The probability that C1 > F  equals
C1 F
C1
for type 1 and
C2 F
C2


















F    (F
)2
2C1
.The equilibrium payo¤ of type 2 is




(1 + r) + F t (35)
If type 2 deviates and selects F = 0 and d = K   I, it makes K   I + C2(1+r)2 ,






(1 + r) + F t because
F  < 2C2(r t)
r



















< F . The di¤erence with the previous








(1 + r) + F t because F  > 2C2(r t)
r
. Hence, two cases are possible.


















If the latter is the case, the equilibrium exists for any x since type 2 does not
deviate even if it is perceived in equilibrium to be type 1 (with positive debt).
In the former case, this equilibrium exists for any x  x. Also note that type
1 never deviates because if 2C1(r t)
r
< F , the optimal strategy for this type is
F = F  even under symmetric information. On top of that type 1 benets from
a lower interest rate on the loan compared to the symmetric information case.
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4. Both types select F > 0 and d = 0. If such an equilibrium exists there will
also exist another equilibrium with d > 0 (follows from Propositions 1 and 2)




any cash that is not distributed as dividend will be "stolen" by the manager.
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